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Abstract:  
In the typical hunter-gatherer society, decision-making is collective, yet decentralized, access to 
resources is shared, goods are distributed via reciprocal exchange, sharing, and gift-giving, and 
the distribution of both income is egalitarian. We argue these features are interrelated. We 
adopt an incentive-based view of sharing and gift-giving: sharing rules and customary gifts 
obligations implement socially desirable production decisions in decentralized fashion, and 
elicit information about agents’ willingness and ability to produce in the face of a common 
resource use/congestion problem. The system may result in a relatively equal distribution of 
income, and the theory is also able to account for some features of the ethnographic record that 
do not jibe well with existing theories of sharing. 
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I.  Introduction 
  The economic organization of hunter-gatherer societies is a subject that has attracted 
increasing attention in recent years.
1 One might attribute some of this interest to the fact that 
the hunter-gatherer economy features a host of what seem to be singular social practices and 
institutions. To give some examples, in the typical hunter-gatherer society decision-making is 
collective, yet decentralized, access to resources is shared, goods are typically distributed via 
reciprocal exchange, sharing, and gift-giving, and the distribution of both income and decision-
making power is egalitarian.  
In this paper we argue that these features of the hunter-gatherer economy are 
interrelated. We adopt an incentive-based view of sharing and gift-giving, in which the 
fundamental role of sharing and gift-giving is to implement socially desirable production 
decisions, given that agents share access to resources. We show how this system decentralizes 
socially desirable decision-making. We also show how this system can solve a related problem 
– extraction of information about individual productive abilities. The sharing and gift system 
has some interesting properties; for example, it may result in a relatively equal distribution of 
income, even though the productive capabilities of agents and effort provision decisions of 
agents differ. Our theory is also able to account for some features of the ethnographic record 
that do not jibe well with existing theories of sharing; for example, why the rather extensive 
free-riding on the efforts of the most productive agents is typically tolerated in hunter-gatherer 
society.  
In our model the output sharing mitigates overexploitation of the commons, a potential 
role for sharing originally hinted at by Alchian and Demsetz (1973), more formally developed 
by Cauley, Cornes, and Sandler (1999) and Ellis (2001), and explored in an experimental   3
setting by Schott, Buckley, Mestelman, and Muller (2004). In contrast to this work, however, 
we explore the consequences of rules when agents vary in their productive capabilities, and we 
direct attention to the informational properties of the rules. For example, we argue that a 
sharing-rule based system of CPR management may have advantages over alternatives such as 
observing effort directly and punishing deviations from established norms, as in, for example, 
Sethi and Somanathan (1996).
2 Given the social organization of hunter-gatherer societies, this 
organizational form places a minimal informational burden on the members of the group.  
Also common among hunter-gatherers is a relatively equal distribution of output, even 
though individuals vary greatly in ability.
3 This implies that some agents share more with 
others and give more to others than they receive in return. While our model does not produce a 
perfectly egalitarian distribution of output, we show that the sharing and gift giving regime may 
result in a relatively egalitarian distribution of output in spite of stark differences in ability 
level.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In section II, we discuss the literature on 
output sharing in hunter-gatherer societies, prominent theories of sharing, and some of the 
difficulties with these theories. In section III, we append the discussion in Section II with more 
detailed information on production and sharing among Kalahari Desert hunter-gatherers. In 
section IV, we develop a simple model that shows how sharing rules among users can feasibly 
mitigate a commons problem without relying upon observation of effort, illustrate a potential 
adverse selection problem created by the sharing scheme, and then show how this adverse 
selection problem might be mitigated through the introduction of gift-giving obligations. 
Section V concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1 See, for example, Baker (2003), Marceau and Myers (2004), and Kaplan and Robson (2003).  
2 Schott, Buckley, Mestleman, and Muller (2004) also make this point.    4
 
II.  Literature on Sharing and Gift-Giving in Hunter-Gatherer Societies 
  A wide variety of theories have been used to describe sharing and gift-giving practices 
in hunter gatherer societies.
4 Most prominent among theories of sharing and gift-giving are 
those based on exchange and insurance. Posner (1980) argues that sharing and obligatory gift 
giving in hunter-gatherer societies, in concert with other institutions, functions as a 
comprehensive insurance system when a formal insurance market is unfeasible. Common 
hunter-gatherer institutions support the insurance plan and mitigate potential free riding. 
Communal living conditions allow easy policing of hoarding and effort, and ease transmission 
of other important information. While anthropologists have stopped short of full consideration 
of the supporting institutions necessary for sharing and gift-giving to function as an insurance 
system, the idea that sharing can reduce variance in individual consumption has been part of the 
conventional wisdom of anthropology at least since the famous "Man the Hunter" conference in 
1966.
5 (Kelly, 1995 p. 167) Generally speaking, so-called variance reduction models are 
successful in explaining many sharing and gift-giving events, in that sharing behavior does 
seem both in simulated models and in practice to greatly reduce variance in consumption.   
Sahlins (1972) is prominent among those who argue that sharing and gift-giving are a 
form of exchange, though this idea also has earlier antecedents - for example, Mauss (1924).
6 
Givers accumulate a reserve of debts through sharing with and giving gifts to others, and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3 See Woodburn (1982). 
4 See Chapter 5 in Kelly (1995). 
5 See Lee and Devore (1968). Cashdan (1990) is a good review of the anthropological literature on variance 
reduction and sharing. Some applications of variance reduction models to specific societies include Winterhalder 
(1981), Stephens (1990) and Hames (1990). Winterhalder (1981, 1986) in particular has shown that sharing and 
gift-giving among even a small number of foragers can result in significant decreases in day-to-day variations in 
output. 
6 A recent model of the relative merits of reciprocal exchange is Kranton (1996), who contrasts the benefits of 
engaging in reciprocal versus market exchange.   5
debtors are obligated to return the favor in the future. Sharing and gift-giving has also been cast 
as trade, in which sharers receive a complementary stream of different goods such as prestige 
(Hawkes, 1993b) or sex (Siskind, 1973). Like insurance theories of sharing, exchange theories 
are apparently successful in explaining many sharing events. 
Both insurance and exchange theories share one difficulty: the rather stark differences 
in individual provision rates that become clear in studies of production and sharing among 
hunter-gatherer groups. Hawkes (1990, 1992, 1993a, 1993b), Kent (1996) and Kaplan and Hill 
(1985a, b), for example, have found consistent and stark differences in the provision rates of 
different hunters/gatherers. Better hunters contribute significantly more to the sharing network 
and others contribute significantly less, even over time periods long enough to permit 
reciprocation of sharing acts. In many instances better hunters go uncompensated for their 
efforts, and strangely, care is often exercised in ensuring that compensation of more productive 
agents is avoided. There also appears to be little pressure for those who consistently produce 
less to increase their output or effort; see, for example Lee (1979), Hawkes (1993a), Kent 
(1996), and Woodburn (1982). Considering the observed differences in provision rates, 
exchange theories do not tell the whole story, as the productive do not receive a complimentary 
stream of goods. Indeed, the social pressure directed towards prevention of moral hazard one 
would expect to coexist with both insurance and exchange-based sharing is absent in the typical 
hunter-gatherer society. Alternative theories of sharing, while capable of explaining some other 
aspects of sharing, do not address this basic point. For example, cooperative acquisition posits 
that sharing occurs because output is produced cooperatively. Kin selection posits that agents 
share with kin relations to increase biological fitness. Tolerated theft posits that sharing occurs   6
because excluding outsiders from consumption is costly.
7 Cooperative acquisition and kin 
selection appear to have limited explanatory power in hunter-gatherer societies where extensive 
fieldwork (generally, South America and Africa) on sharing has been done. In these locations, 
hunters spend the bulk of their time hunting independently and dispersed over the landscape, 
yet game is still shared extensively.
8 In many cases, no significant bias towards sharing more 
with closer relations emerges, as kin selection predicts.
9 
  To summarize, the biggest problem with theories of sharing is that they do not explain 
why some agents apparently do so little, without any sort of pressure from other group 
members. If exchange or insurance were the sole reason for sharing, one would expect that 
control of moral hazard would be a priority. To make this point a bit more concrete, we now 
discuss in detail some evidence on the nature of sharing among Kalahari hunting and gathering 
peoples.  
   
III.  Sharing in the Kalahari 
Anthropologists have extensively studied Kalahari societies and have produced detailed 
data on individual production decisions and sharing rates among Kalahari peoples. Among 
these peoples, most explanations for sharing perform rather poorly.
10 The most interesting 
feature of sharing which emerges in this data is the pronounced disparity in individual 
production and hunting efforts, in spite of the fact that hunting effort or productivity is 
                                                           
7 See Blurton Jones (1983) and Kelly (1995, Chapter 5) on tolerated theft. Anderson and Swimmer (1997) discuss, 
in a property rights context, what is essentially a tolerated theft model. They find some supporting evidence in a 
cross-cultural analysis of 40 North American peoples. 
8 Among many people, such as the Mbuti, much hunting is cooperative. Cooperative acquisition may thus be a 
sufficient, but not necessary, condition for sharing, as Kaplan and Hill (1985a,1985b) note.   
9 Kelly (1995, Chapter 5).  See also Kaplan and Hill (1985a, 1985b). 
10 Among South American hunter-foragers such as the Yanomamo [Hames (1990)] and the Ache [Kaplan, Hill, and 
Hurtado (1990)] there is similar evidence. However, among South American hunter-gatherers, there is limited   7
apparently undirected or rewarded and much output must be shared. Also interesting is the lack 
of concern over the apparently low effort levels exerted by some agents.   
       The !Kung San (also referred to as Jo'Huansi) of the northwest Kalahari are one of the 
most intensively studied hunter-gatherer peoples.
11 The !Kung live in groups of approximately 
20 people that collectively maintain loose association with a specific tract of land, usually 
centered around a watering hole. Everyone in the group maintains free access to resources in 
the area, and while outsiders may use the group’s resources, it is expected that they receive 
permission, or actively observe group rules during their stay.
12    
The !Kung subsist on a variety of plant and foodstuffs found in the region. Giraffe, 
warthog, gemsbok, kudu, wildebeest, eland, roan antelope and hartebeest count among the most 
frequently taken large game resources, though the warthog is the most regularly taken game 
animal. Individuals equipped with digging sticks obtain gathered resources. While cooperative 
hunting occurs, solitary individuals do most hunting.  Hunting is done most commonly with 
poisoned arrows, and sometimes using traps. Individuals are free to choose when and where 
they would like to hunt. There are considerable differences in hunter skill and production effort 
in the camp. The best hunters are not awarded with prestige or in other ways, and members of 
the camp in fact devote significant energy to ensuring that successful producers are not 
compensated. Hunters boastful of their success are subject to ridicule and scorn, and modesty is 
expected (see Woodburn (1982, p. 440) or Lee (1979, p. 243-246)). Both income and power are 
distributed relatively equally among members of the group – !Kung society is egalitarian.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
evidence that suggests better hunters are compensated by sex [e.g. Hawkes (1993 (b)), Hames (1990)]. Also, more 
hunting is done cooperatively among these peoples. See Kelly (1995). 
11 A detailed description of the !Kung is Lee (1979), and where not otherwise noted, the exposition relies heavily 
on parts of his book, especially chapters 4, 7, 8, and 12. 
12 See Woodburn (1982), Marshall (1976), or Lee (1979). See Baker (2003) for a detailed discussion of land 
ownership among the !Kung and other hunter-gatherers.   8
Lee (1979) reports information on the nature of the sharing and work habits of a group 
of 12 able-bodied !Kung hunters over a one-month period. The most skilled hunter hunted 16 
days over the period and provided 65% of the community's meat by killing four warthog; only 
two other hunters produced in excess of their own caloric needs. One of these hunters, named 
≠ Toma, was approximately 60 years old.  Three other hunters produced some meat over the 
period of observation, but not enough to support themselves and their families. One hunter was 
completely unsuccessful over four hunting days, and four of the twelve able-bodied men in the 
camp did no hunting at all over the period. In spite of the rather stark differences in effort and 
the resulting differences in acquired game, no individual was excluded from consumption of 
the take, and consumption appeared to bear no relation to the amount an individual provided. In 
fact, distribution and sharing of game is serious business; Lee (1982) writes that “…the most 
serious accusations that one !Kung can level against another are the charge of stinginess and the 
charge of arrogance.” (Lee 1982, p. 45)  
One might wonder if these patterns persist over longer time periods, or if the hunters are 
simply rotating vacation time. Evidence from a nearby people suggests that these patterns 
emerge even over extended periods of time. Kent (1996) observed production and sharing 
differences amongst the Kutse Basarwa, a people of the central Kalahari similar in custom and 
material culture to the !Kung. Kent’s data spans a much longer time period than Lee's; she 
studied hunting variation and sharing amongst the Kutse over a five-year period in which 175 
hunting trips were observed over 290 days between 1987 and 1991. She also finds consistent 
disparities in contributions to the needs of the group, though some hunters often take extended 
periods of time off from hunting. For example, "Hunter 1...a relatively poor hunter, brings in 
more meat through sharing than he loses, while Hunter 5 loses more meat through sharing than   9
he gains" and "Hunter 5 consistently shared more meat with friends and kin than he received”  
(Kent (1996, p. 148)). Kent investigates the fitness rates of some of the hunters, and concludes 
that better hunters are offered no additional social prestige, and no special advantage in terms 
of mating preference, but continue to provide most of the food for the group.  
While there is apparently no attempt to police or monitor the activities of others, the 
nature of hunting in the Kalahari suggests that directly monitoring effort or even attempting to 
infer effort from output would be exceedingly difficult. In the Kalahari, hunters often travel 
substantial distances away from camp while hunting, and a hunter is never certain if his arrow 
has hit the mark or if enough poison has entered the target animal's bloodstream. Animals take 
anywhere from six to twenty-four hours to die after being hit by a poison arrow, and in the 
interim the game may be lost or eaten by lions. Lee reports Yellen’s estimate that about %50 of 
all animals wounded by the !Kung escape. (Lee (1979, p. 221)) Thus, there is a rather tedious 
link between effort and output given the nature of  !Kung production. 
While it is difficult to infer the effort levels of others, individuals are certainly 
cognizant of differences in skill. Kent writes of the Kutse that "Although on one level people 
know that some hunters are more skillful than others, they usually do not discuss it or analyze 
why." (Kent, 1996, p. 145-6) Kent also writes: "During an interview when [a poorer hunter] 
was absent, others within his sharing network were unwilling to speculate about his 
consistently poor success, beyond suggestions that maybe his traps or their locations were not 
good." (Kent, 1996, p. 146). 
We may draw the following points from this evidence: 1) some hunters are more skilled 
than others, 2) skilled hunters provide a disproportionate amount of the game, while some 
hunters engage in significantly lower levels of activity, 3) it appears that better hunters are not   10
compensated for their exemplary efforts, 4) hunters are typically free to decide where, how, and 
when they would like to hunt, but share their output according to well-specified, customary 
rules, 5) given the high variability of production, it is difficult to infer hunting effort directly 
from output, 6) it is difficult to hide game from others once it actually has been obtained, and 7)  
society is egalitarian, in the sense that the distribution of income is roughly equal.  
Given these stylized facts about the nature of sharing, we now turn to describing how a 
system of gifts and sharing rules, rectifies an overuse problem, and how the implied nature of 
the income distribution and effort decisions coincide with the 7 stylized facts described in the 
previous paragraph.  
  
IV.  The Model 
This section proceeds by first solving for a sharing rule that internalizes the common 
property use externality when agents differ in productive abilities and face a common 
production problem. We then show how a system of gift-giving can be superimposed upon the 
sharing regime to elicit correct information about hunter productivities 
Some literature has discussed the possibility that sharing according to customary rules 
may have some desirable properties when resources are commonly owned. Alchian and 
Demsetz (1973, p.25) speculate that output sharing and shared access to resources coexists 
because "sharing may cure the overhunting problem by creating an underhunting problem," but 
do not investigate the possibility formally and dismiss the idea.
13  Cornes and Sandler (1996, 
pg. 284-9) discuss sharing rules that trade off overuse and underuse effects to social benefit. 
                                                           
13This argument has also been hinted at by Harris (1983). Alchain and Demsetz center their argument against 
sharing as a resource management tool centers on the idea that it implies excessive control over the production 
process, whereas our argument, to some degree, implies the opposite.  
   11
They describe the crucial effect output sharing has in altering resource use incentives: output 
sharing introduces a free riding incentive that may counteract the commons problem. Cauley, 
Cornes, and Sandler (1999) also discuss of sharing rules and the countervailing effects of such 
rules. They present a rule that is a combination of effort-proportional sharing and equal sharing, 
and show that this rule can provide first-best use incentives. Ellis (2003) contains a discussion 
of sharing rules which mitigate overuse resources, and Schott, Buckley, Mestleman, and Muller 
(2003) provide experimental support for the idea that sharing might mitigate overuse of 
common property resources. Our model is distinct from other work in the literature in that it 
does not rely directly on the observation of the effort levels of agents and takes into account 
differences in agents’ productive capabilities.   
The basic framework is the standard CPR model (see Dasgupta and Heal 1979 and 
Cornes and Sandler 1996). A group of  N  risk-neutral agents shares access to a productive 
resource. We consider the group size to be exogenously determined, though the group size 
could be understood as the result of a welfare-maximizing decision.
14 Let  i x  denote the effort 
level of agent i,  ∑ = i x X , and let  i q  denote the output of agent i. The production function 
for each agent is given by:  
  i i i X A x q ε ) ( ~ = ,    
Where  A represents average product and  0 , 0 < ′ ′ < ′ A A .  The important thing about the 
production function is that it captures the idea that the effort of one hunter imposes a negative 
externality on other hunters. This could be either due to the familiar commons effect, or it could 
be understood as due to a congestion effect, where one hunter’s efforts “get in the way” of the 
activities of others.  i ε  is an agent-specific random variable with a mean of unity, which we   12
include merely as a way of reminding the reader that effort is not directly inferable from output. 
Expected output for agent iis: 
) ( ] ) ( [ ] ~ [ X A x X A x E q E q i i i i i = = = ε . 
Effort costs for each agent are given by  0 , 0 ), ( ≥ ′ ′ > ′ c c x c i i . We capture differences in 
the capabilities of agents through differences in the costs-of-effort function.. Expected group 
payoffs are:  
∑∑ − = Π
ii
i i i x c X A x ) ( ) ( ,        ( 1 )  
Differentiation of (1) with respect to each of the N  effort levels results in the following 
first-order conditions describing socially optimal effort levels: 
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Let 
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i x  denote the solutions to (2), and let  ∑ =
* *
i x X .  Note that an implication of (2) 
is that at the optimum  j i c c ′ = ′ , which implies that if  ) ( ) ( x c x c j i <  and  ) ( ) ( x c x c j i ′ < ′  for a given 
x, then 
* *
j i x x > . Thus, it is socially desirable that those agents who are better hunters provide 
more effort (and thus, on average, more output) at the social optimum. Agents do not choose 
their effort levels according to (2), and instead choose effort to maximize own expected returns:  
) ( ) ( i i i i x c X A x − = π ,         ( 3 )    
Differentiation of (3) with respect to  i x  results in the following first order conditions 
describing Nash equilibrium effort levels:  
0 = ′ − ′ + i i c A x A .         ( 4 )  
                                                                                                                                                                          
14 For a model of such a decision, see Lueck (1994) or Anderson and Swimmer (1997).  See also Wagner (1995).   13
Comparing (2) and (4) illustrates the commons problem. It is straightforward to see that 
all agents exert too much effort in hunting at the Nash equilibrium. Output sharing rules allow 
unregulated resource access and use to the local community of agents, but require that agents 
share the output obtained from using the common resource with others according to specific 
rules. To parameterize sharing, let tik ,  denote the percentage of agent i's output that must be 
shared with agent k . The rules can be thought of as customary in the sense that they are not set 
by any particular agent.
15 The rules are fixed in that they require each agent to make a 
percentage payment of his output to each other agent, and this percentage does not change with 
the level of effort an agent actually chooses.
16 For the sharing rules to be feasible, we require 








, .   
Under the sharing scheme, the expected payoffs of agent i can be written as:  
∑∑
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− + − =
i ki k
i i k i k k i i i x c X A x t t X A x ) ( ) ( ) 1 )( ( , , π     (5) 
The first-order conditions associated with maximization of (5) are: 
∑ ∑
≠≠
′ − ′ + − ′ +
i ki k
i k i k k i i c X A x t t X A x A ) ( ) 1 ))( ( ( , ,     (6). 
Equation (4) reveals the same effects introduced by the sharing rules discussed in 
Cornes and Sandler (1996). Agents reduce effort for two reasons: because they must share with 
others, and because others must share with them. The latter effect is less familiar than the first, 
and occurs because agents do not wish to reduce the amount that they receive from other agents 
                                                           
15 A benevolent elder(s) concerned with group welfare could have set the rules in the past, or gradually evolved 
towards efficiency through a process of trial and error. The rules then persisted to the present because they are 
efficient.   
16 Contrast this with Cauley, Cornes, and Sandler (1999), in which sharing rules depend on the effort levels that 
agents choose, or Schott, Mestleman, Buckley, and Muller (2004), in which equal sharing rules are imposed.   14
by increasing effort and therefore reducing the average product of other agents. Consider the 
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  In the appendix, we demonstrate that the rules in (7) provide first best use incentives for 
all agents, and are also feasible. We also outline the method by which we obtained these 
sharing rules in the appendix. The sharing rules in (7) have a peculiar feature: they require that 
agent i pay a share of his output to agent k  based on agent k ’s optimal level of effort. Thus, if 
k  is relatively more productive than other agents, and should in equilibrium exert higher 
hunting effort, he should receive a larger share of the output of other agents. A little algebra 
reveals that if this sharing system was in place, the resulting distribution of output is exactly the 
distribution that would emerge if agents collectively agreed to exert first-best effort levels 





j i x c x A x − ∑
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 under the sharing system. 
  While (7) demonstrates that a budget-balancing sharing rule can always be found, the 
problems with the sharing system described by (7) are twofold. A first, practical problem is 
with implementing the sharing rule; agents have incentives to misrepresent their abilities. 
Given that better hunters must receive larger shares of the output of others under the sharing 
scheme, agents have incentives to claim to be better hunters than they in fact are. From our 
discussion of the evidence in section II, it seems that hunters are generally knowledgeable 
about the skills of others in spite of the fact that they spend no time or effort observing the 
skills of others or trying to mislead others about their skills. It therefore seems reasonable to 
suppose that information on ability is offered voluntarily. But the sharing system described by 
(7) indicates that this shouldn’t be the case. A second problem with the sharing system in (7) is   15
that it may produce a widely disparate distribution of output among the agents, particularly if 
productivity differences among agents are large. This is also inconsistent with the features of 
the empirical record highlighted in section II. 
  We now turn to showing, for a simple and specialized example, how requiring hunters 
who claim to be high productivity to also pay a gift obligation to low productivity hunters can, 
under some conditions, elicit information from agents about their type. A by-product of the 
sharing-gift obligation system is that it tends to produce a roughly egalitarian distribution of 
output among the members of the tribe. The intuition is that the sharing/gift obligation system 
can be viewed as a mechanism which, under some conditions, can elicit information about 
hunter type and also provide incentives for socially optimal production decisions.  
Along these lines, consider a tribe composed of two hunters, each of whom has 
imperfect information about the type of the other, who may be either a high or a low 
productivity hunter with the (publicly known) probability of p . Let  i x  denote the effort level of 
agent i, and let  } , { l h i ∈ φ  denote agent i’s type. As before, hunters are distinguished by their 
costs of exerting hunting effort: the costs of effort for a high productivity hunter are zero, while 
the costs of effort for low productivity hunters are given by l cx , with  0 > c . The expected 
output of any given agent is given by the function: 
) (X A x q i i = ,  X X A α − Α = ) (,   2 1 x x X + = .   (8) 
First-best effort levels depend upon tribe composition. Given (8) and the nature of the 
costs-of-effort function, optimal effort levels are symmetric when the tribe is composed of two 
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The solutions in (10) result because effort is costly for low types but not for high types; 
therefore, at the social optimum only the high type should exert effort. Making note of (10) and 
applying (7) reveals that the following sharing system institutes first best effort levels, given 
the distribution of types among members of the tribe:  
c
c
t l ll j i + Α
− Α
= → = =
2
1
φ φ ;        ( 1 1 . a )  
2
1
= → = = hh j i t h φ φ ;       ( 1 1 . b )  
1 , 0 , = = → = = lh hl j i t t h l φ φ .      ( 1 1 . c )  
The sharing system in (11) indicates that the average volume of sharing is larger when 
the tribe is composed of high productivity hunters (compare (11.a) with (11.c)). The rules in 
(11.b), when the agents are of different types, are a result of the “corner solution” 
characteristics of optimal effort levels described in (10). In this case, optimal effort levels are 
implemented by requiring that a high productivity hunter not share at all with a low 
productivity hunter, while at the same time a low productivity hunter should share all of his 
output with the high productivity hunter. This reduces the effort levels of low productivity 
hunters to zero in accordance with the social optimum. This also illustrates the low productivity 
hunter’s incentive to overstate his abilities; if a low productivity hunter always claims to be a 
high productivity hunter, he will clearly always do better than receiving no output.  
So far, we have not yet offered any sort of distinction between gift-giving and sharing; 
indeed, it is perhaps impossible to distinguish between the two types of behavior in practice.   17
Now, we adopt the practical convention that “sharing” refers to a transfer of a share of output 
created, while “gift-giving” refers to a lump-sum transfer given from one agent to another. We 
can now show how, under certain conditions, the incentive of low productivity hunters to claim 
to be high productivity hunters can be removed by introducing gift obligations for high-
productivity hunters. Agents cannot opt out of this system regardless of their skill level; 
perhaps refusal to participate in such an important group behavior would mean that the offender 
would be shunned or ostracized from other group activities. Along these lines, consider the 
following mechanism:  
1.  Nature moves first and randomly determines the types of the two agents. The 
(common knowledge) probability that an agent is a high (low) type is  p ( p − 1) .  
Agents learn their types, and then simultaneously announce either  h i = φ ˆ  or  l i = φ ˆ .  
2.  Dependent upon the revealed types of each agent, the corresponding sharing system 
in (11) is instituted, with the following caveat: In the event that one agent is a high 
type and the other is a low type, the high type is obligated to pay a lump-sum gift of 
G  to the low type.  
3.  Production occurs, outputs are observed, and all gift and sharing transactions are 
executed.   
 
Our task is to find a gift obligation G  under which truthful type revelation is a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium for either type of agent, given incomplete information about the other agent’s 
type. Consider figure 1, which describes the incomplete information game instituted by the 
mechanism from the perspective of the high-productivity player. Figure 1 shows the payoffs for 
a high type given the sharing system implemented under each possible outcome of the game.
17 
For truth-telling to be an equilibrium, given the expectation that the opposite player is tells the 
truth, it is required that (using the result on figure 1) the following inequality hold:  
                                                           
17 One detail of interest in computing these equilibrium payoffs: due to the linearity of production functions and 
the sharing rules, a low productivity agent never exerts effort in equilibrium when paired with a high type agent,  
and a) the high type agent has lied about his type while the low type agent has told the truth, and b) when the low 
type agent claims to be a high type agent yet the high type agent has told the truth.    18
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The similar condition for low types (given that the other player is expected to tell the 
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Equation (13) is an inequality requiring that G  be sufficiently large so that low types 
will prefer to correctly reveal their type. The inequality in equation (12) requires that G  be 
sufficiently small so that high types will prefer to correctly reveal their type, rather than 
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Rearranging (13) for G  gives the bound:  
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Equation (15) indicates that the frequency of high types in the population must be 
sufficiently small. The logic behind this result is simple. The chief reason low productivity 
agents wish to misrepresent their type is to get a larger share of the high productivity agent’s 
output. However, if the other agent is likely to also be low productivity, it is unlikely 
misrepresentation conveys this benefit, and lying more often than not just distorts the sharing 
scheme.   19
In a world in which the constraint (16) is not satisfied, there are alternative sharing 
schemes which will typically involve some sort of welfare loss relative to the first-best in some 
states of nature, which may or may not rely on gift-giving. For example, consider the sharing 
rule  2
1 = = = = lh hl ll hh t t t t , which is derived from applying the first-best sharing rule for high 
types in every situation. In this case, each agent always pays half of his output to other agents. 
One can show that this rule results in no distortions, and removes any incentives for agents to 
misrepresent their abilities, but involves a distortion in the state of nature where both agents are 




, each agent earns the lower 
payoff 
α 8
) 2 ( A c A−
. The question then becomes whether the simplicity of the system is worth 
the expected output loss that must be tolerated.
18  
A further point to note about the sharing and gift-giving mechanism is that it is 
somewhat fragile, in that there are other equilibria (one where agents are expected to lie, and a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium), and agents must be compelled to participate. This is perhaps how 
it should be; in that sharing and gift giving are typically complex social processes and as such 
are fragile, and depend on the goodwill of the participants. On a more positive note, the 
example exploits the additional degrees of freedom in sharing rules that were glossed over in 
the previous part of the paper. Inspection of (5) and (6), for example, shows that in any state of 
the world, there are n first order conditions associated with agents’ maximizing behavior, but 
there are potentially many more sharing instruments (for any given population, there are n (n -
1) potential sharing instruments). An interesting subject for future research would be an 
investigation of the sharing and gift giving system under more general conditions.  
                                                           
18 A second possibility is to set the sharing rule at the low-type optimal sharing rule, or to use a rule that is some   20
Given its apparent theoretical complexity, why might hunter-gatherers resort to such 
sharing and gift-giving systems to regulate a commons problem, instead of some other 
possibility? The nature of production in the Kalahari Desert discussed in section III suggest 
some answers. Typical methods discussed in the literature for governance of common property 
generally center around observation of effort; for example, punishment strategies in repeated-
interaction settings as in Sethi and Somanathan (1996), and the proportional-effort sharing rules 
discussed in Cauley, Cornes and Sandler (1999). Lueck (1994), in comparing shared access and 
private ownership, points out that private ownership is one solution to the commons problem, 
but also requires monitoring of effort, which may be costly in particular situations. The 
advantage of the sharing and gift-giving system presented here is that knowledge of output, but 
not productive ability or effort, is required.
19 In the typical hunting and gathering society, this 
system seems to place a minimal informational burden on the members of society, since 
dispersed decision-making is required due to the nature of hunting, but agents typically must 
bring home their output and live in relatively close quarters. Under these circumstances, it 
seems as though observation of output might be relatively easy, while actually monitoring 
effort or ability is a bit more difficult.  
  
2.3 Conclusion 
We have shown how sharing rules can function as tools providing optimal use 
incentives when resources are commonly owned. Gift obligations can, under some conditions, 
be used to extract information about hunter type, but may also result in a relatively egalitarian 
distribution of output. These results align well with several features of life in hunter-gatherer 
                                                                                                                                                                          
sharing rule in between.  
19 This advantage is also stressed by Schott, Buckley, Mestelman, and Muller (2004).   21
societies that are not adequately explained by existing theories of sharing or gift-giving: the 
extensiveness and tolerance of what appears to be free-riding, and why better hunters continue 
to provide most of the output for the group even when production decisions are greatly 
decentralized and participation is optional. One topic of interest for future research is a more 
thorough investigation of the general properties of the sharing and gift giving scheme with 
more than just two agents, and under more general production and cost conditions.    22
APPENDIX 
We begin by describing the method we employed for finding the sharing rules. For 
reference purposes, it is useful to reproduce (2), which describes socially desirable effort levels:  
N i c A x A
N
j
i j ,..., 3 , 2 , 1 ; 0
1
= = ′ − ′ +∑
=
.       ( A 1 )  
Equation (6) describes optimal effort decisions of agents under the sharing scheme:  
∑ ∑
≠≠
′ − ′ + − ′ +
i ki k
i k i k k i i c X A x t t X A x A ) ( ) 1 ))( ( ( , , .    (A2) 
Our task is to choose the sharing instruments  k i t , in (A2) so that (A1) is replicated. 
Rearranging (A1) and (A2) so that the costs of effort term  i c′ is on the right-hand side, equating 
the result and simplifying reveals that the sharing rules, if they are to provide first-best use 
incentives, must satisfy in equilibrium the following conditions: 
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The system of N  equations in (A3) cannot generally be solved exclusively for the 
sharing instruments in the case in which  3 ≥ N  because there are more sharing instruments 
than agents. If, however,  2 = N , (A3) produces two equations, and there are only two sharing 
instruments. These two equations are then:  
A x x A A x t t A x A ′ + + = ′ + − ′ + ) ( ) 1 )( ( 2 1
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2 1 , 2 2 , 1
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1     (A4.1) 
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1 2 , 1 1 , 2
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The sharing rules in (A5) are of the general form used in the paper; our general sharing 
rules presented in (7) simply extend the form of (A5) to the case in which  3 ≥ N . We now 
proceed to show that these sharing rules indeed result in Nash equilibrium first best effort, and 
then show that the sharing rules are budget-balancing for the general case.  
We first show that exerting optimal effort is a Nash equilibrium under the sharing rules. 
It is helpful to call the sum of efforts excepting agent i as  i X − , where 
*
i X −  indicates that every 
other agent besides i is exerting first-best effort. The idea is to show that, given the rules, if   23
*
i i X X − − = , the best response of agent i is to choose 
*
i i x x = . The first-order condition for 
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          ( A 8 )  
To test that choosing 
*
i i x x =  is indeed a best response for agent i, given that all other 
agents choose 
*
k k x x = , substitute 
*
k k x x =  and 
*
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          ( A 9 )  
*
i i x x =  is a solution of (A9), as the substitution 
*
i i x x =  causes this expression to 
collapse to equation (4). Thus, if every other agent is exerting optimal effort under the sharing 
rules, it is agent i’s best response to choose 
*
i i x x = .  
To show that the rules sum to an amount strictly less than one, rewrite (2) as 
∑
=
′ = ′ +
N
j
i j c X A x X A
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Since the right-hand side of (A13) are the sharing rules, we may conclude that they sum 
to an amount strictly less than one.    25
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Figure 1: The Incomplete Information game from the perspective of a given high productivity 
hunter (strategies in rows; opponent’s strategies are in columns). 
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Figure 2: The incomplete information game deriving from the mechanism from the perspective 
of a given low type (strategies in rows; opponent’s strategies in columns).  
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